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When people think of computer hacking, they tend to think of some 
fictional character sitting in their parent’s basement while they try to take 
down some website through various “evil” coding methods.  Hacking, as 
covered by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), is actually 
much more prevalent and could mean serious prison time for unsuspecting 
employees.  The CFAA is a federal law that both criminalizes and holds 
people civilly liable when they “exceed[] authorized access.”  Due to poor 
drafting, circuits split on whether to read that language broadly and or 
narrowly, meaning some defendants walk free while others face up to ten 
years in prison.  I argue the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari 
in Nosal v. United States, and should adopt a broad interpretation of the 
CFAA to hold people accountable for when they violate the intended-use 
of information.  I make two suggestions on how to modernize the CFAA to 
keep up with the current pace of cybersecurity law.  Finally, I propose 
some steps employers can take now to protect their information in the 
interim. 
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I. OFFLINE 
In the thirty years since the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(“CFAA”) became law, the number of the technological advancements 
that have taken place is almost unquantifiable.  Aimed at protecting people 
against white-collar crime and the rise of hackers, the CFAA made 
hacking and certain misuse of computers illegal.1 
When the CFAA was introduced in the early 1980s, the federal 
government was using approximately 18,000 computers.2  In contrast, in 
March 2014, the Washington Post estimated that the federal government 
now uses more than 4 million computers.3  The difference in the number 
of computers alone shows the reliance on both the machines and the data 
those machines make possible. 
The CFAA both criminalizes certain behaviors and makes people 
civilly liable for “exceeding authorized access” of a computer.4  The issue 
came to Congress’ attention in the early 1980s when a group of Milwaukee 
                                                                                                                         
 1 H. R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 4 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3690. 
 2 S. REP. NO. 99-432 at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2479. 
 3 Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, Government computers running Windows XP 
will be vulnerable to hackers after April 8, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 16, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/government-computers-running-
windows-xp-will-be-vulnerable-to-hackers-after-april-8/2014/03/16/9a9c8c7c-a553-
11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html. 
 4 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (West 1986).  The cases surrounding this Act range 
from a police officer who improperly used a government database to a Major League 
Baseball recruiter who hacked into the Houston Astros email system; See United States v. 
Valle, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015); See also The Associated Press, Christopher Correa, 
Former Cardinals Executive, Sentenced to Four Years for Hacking Astros’ Database, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/sports/baseball/christopher-
correa-a-former-cardinals-executive-sentenced-to-four-years-for-hacking-astros-
database.html?_r=0. 
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teenagers, known as the 414 Gang (after their area code), were able to hack 
into a cancer treatment center.5  The teenagers gained access to records of 
some 6,000 cancer patients and even had the ability to change radiation 
treatment levels.6  The incident took a small financial toll on the center, 
but the life-threatening nature of the hack caused the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary concern and led to the modern-day language of the 
CFAA.7 
The CFAA can be used to criminally prosecute someone or can be 
used in a civil lawsuit.8  The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits claim that 
the CFAA is much too vague to successfully prosecute or sue under, 
except in very limited circumstances.9  Courts and scholars named this the 
“narrow” interpretation because these courts utilize a more literal 
interpretation of the CFAA language.10  In contrast, the First, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits use a “broad” interpretation of the CFAA 
by construing the language as an intended-use analysis, making 
prosecution and lawsuits more judicially feasible.11  This means that the 
First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, interpret improper use of data 
as actually exceeding authorized access.12 
This Comment will analyze the purpose of the CFAA by quickly 
dissecting the House of Representatives’ and the Senate’s approach to the 
law in Part II.  Then, this Comment will examine the circuit split, teasing 
out the two different interpretations of the law and how those 
interpretations create either a prosecution-friendly or plaintiff-friendly 
jurisdiction versus a defendant-friendly jurisdiction.  Next, in Part III, this 
Comment will analyze the differing viewpoints of the varying 
interpretations.  Part IV will suggest two options for how to handle the 
circuit split: an analysis of the current language and an explanation as to 
why the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari, and in doing so, 
why the Supreme Court should adopt the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of 
                                                                                                                         
 5 Will Storr, The kid hackers who starred in a real-life WarGames, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 
16, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/film/the-414s/hackers-wargames-true-story/. 
 6 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3. 
 7 Storr, supra note 5; See also S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2480 (describing how the 414 Gang was a concern for the Senate when 
deciding on the appropriate language for the CFAA). 
 8 See § 1030. 
 9 See infra Section II.C. See also § 1030.  Specifically, the Second, Fourth, and Ninth 
Circuits operate under the assumption that improper data use is not exceeding authorized 
access if the person did in fact have authorized access to the computer. 
 10 Am. Furukawa, Inc. v. Hossain, 103 F.Supp.3d 864, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 11 See infra Section II.D. 
 12 See infra Section II.D.  See also Hossain, 103 F.Supp.3d at 871.  This “broad” 
interpretation is based on an intended-use analysis, meaning employees or competitors can 
be prosecuted for using data in a manner not intended by the original source. 
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the law.  Alternatively, Part IV will put forth an argument that the CFAA 
should be repealed and replaced with two different statutes: one for 
criminal culpability with a separate section for offenders who are 
government operatives, and another concerning civil liability. 
II. BOOTING UP: BACKGROUND ON CFAA 
The original language of the CFAA prohibited “accessing a computer 
without authorization, or it [sic] authorized, abusing that authorization and 
obtaining what generically is considered to be classified.”13  An 
amendment switched that language to “exceeds authorized access.”14  The 
chairperson of the ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force on Computer 
Crime suggested the switch after the original 1984 statute left many terms 
undefined and confusing.15  This ambiguity, along with the evolving nature 
of hacking and the need to comprehensively cover employees’ behavior, 
resulted in the language’s change.16  The switch caused a rift among the 
circuit courts in interpreting the Act.17  For the past thirty years, federal 
courts battled with the language of “exceeds authorized access,” dividing 
themselves into two distinct camps.18 
A. How Do You Use This Thing? Congressional Action on Computer 
Security 
In 1983, the House of Representatives introduced a bill that would 
eventually become the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.19  First, 
Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.20  The 
House Committee on the Judiciary found white-collar crimes were 
neglected on both a federal and a state level.21  At the time, the only statutes 
remotely dealing with cybersecurity were mail fraud or wire fraud.22 
                                                                                                                         
 13 H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 21 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3707. 
 14 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–474, 100 Stat. 1213 PL 99–
474 (1986). 
 15 Dodd S. Griffith, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured 
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 470 (1990).  Examples of terms 
left undefined included: “access,” “authorization,” “affects” and “use”. 
 16 Id. 
 17 See infra Part II. 
 18 See infra Section II.C-D. 
 19 H.R. REP. NO. 98-894 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689. 
 20 Scott Eltringham, Prosecuting Computer Crimes, OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., at 1 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2017). 
 21 H. R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 4. 
 22 Id. at 6.  Even if mail fraud or wire fraud would cover the alleged conduct, because 
there was no specific framework of how to go about charging someone for a computer-
related crime these cases were treated as an “untested basis for prosecution.” 
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The Senate also expressed concerns over the rise of hackers.23  After 
passing the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Congress continued to 
investigate potential computer crimes and possible statutory solutions.24  
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary cited the 414 Gang incident as a 
serious concern over the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act.25 After the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, the Justice 
Department criticized the scope of the act as being too narrow because the 
original version only protected a particular set of financial and credit 
information.26 
The American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Criminal Justice Section 
Task Force on Computer Crime suggested the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act needed to define terms such as “access,” “authorization,” 
“affects,” and “use.”27  The Task Force also noted that while the terms 
used in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act would cover hackers, the 
terms were still too vague when dealing with employees.28  While 
Congress wanted to protect employees who were using data appropriately, 
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act provided almost no guidance on 
how to handle the idea that employees could have access to data and still 
“access without authorization,” as the original language stated.29  The Task 
Force also wanted the Federal Bureau of Investigations to have primary 
investigative jurisdiction because, at the time, the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act mainly covered government computers.30  Finally, the task 
force wanted a civil remedies option because the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act did not have one.31 
In 1986, the CFAA, as it is known today, passed with changes to 
definitions, the scope of the Act, and an attempt to fix some of the 
ambiguous language.32  Specifically, the Act’s language changed from “or 
having accessed a computer without authorization” in the Comprehensive 
                                                                                                                         
 23 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479.  Hackers 
are generally defined as “[a] person who writes in assembly language or in system-level 
languages, such as C.”  Hacker, PC MAG, 
https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/44047/hacker. (last accessed Jan. 29, 2017).  
However, hacker in this context is referring to someone who conducts “computer 
sabotage.”  Id. 
 24 Eltringham, supra note 20, at 1. 
 25 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3 
 26 Griffith, supra note 15, at 467. 
 27 Id.at 470. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 471. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Griffith, supra note 15, at 474. 
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Crime Control Act to “or exceeds authorized access,” in the CFAA.33  
Congress aimed at making the “cumbersome” language of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act simpler.34  The CFAA defines 
“exceeds authorized use” as “access[ing] a computer with authorization 
and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that 
the accesser is not entitled to obtain or alter[.]”35  While this change 
attempted to fix some of the problems of the previous Act, it has not been 
enough to keep the courts from adopting drastically different 
interpretations. 
B. Ctrl +: How Cases Arise Under the CFAA and Practical Examples 
The Department of Justice identifies three types of cases that arise 
from the “exceeds authorized access” language.36  Practitioners dealing 
with the CFAA would not know these “categories” as the Department of 
Justice has named them, but, for clarity’s sake, this comment will refer to 
cases by their category to give a firm example of how the CFAA arises 
and how it is interpreted.37  First, when a person is prohibited from 
accessing the information expressly; second, when a person has authorized 
access to the information and is expressly forbidden from using the 
information in certain ways, but the access of the information is not 
conditioned on obeying the restrictions; and third, when a person has not 
been commanded to avoid certain uses of the information but does so 
against the authorizing party’s best interest.38 
To better understand these three areas, consider the following: an 
employee enters information into a database for work.  If the employee 
were to then access another program from another department, this would 
be an example of the first situation.39  She was not given authorization and 
then gained access anyway.  For the second category, suppose a person 
builds a program that will track the changes to a website and compiles that 
information into a spreadsheet.40  Even though the website expressly 
prohibits people from doing this, the website did not condition the person’s 
access of the information on not using the information in a certain way.41  
Finally, if an employee was given access to a certain database, and told to 
not research personal interests in the database (say a neighbor’s billing 
                                                                                                                         
 33 Id. 
 34 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 9 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2486. 
 35 18. U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(6) (West 1986). 
 36 Eltringham, supra, at 9-10. 
 37 Id. at 10. 
 38 Id. at 9. 
 39 See generally id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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statement,) but does so anyway, this is an example of the third category of 
cases.42  The third category of cases is more controversial because the 
courts struggle with the narrow and broad interpretation of the CFAA 
regarding employee’s access.  A vast majority of cases used in this 
Comment will be from that third category.43 
C. Right Click: Narrow Interpretations 
In May of 2012, New York City police officer Gilberto Valle logged 
onto the Omnixx Force Mobile and searched for a woman he knew for 
years.44  The program allows officers access to restricted databases, which 
include private information, such as home addresses and birthdates, as 
well as the federal National Crime Information Center database.45  Valle 
used that information to discuss kidnapping the woman with another user 
of the Dark Fetish Network—an Internet site for the sex-fetish 
community.46  Valle had access to the Omnixx Force Mobile program for 
his job as a New York City police officer.47  Valle’s misuse of the Omnixx 
Force Mobile resulted in prosecutors charging Valle under the CFAA.48  A 
jury found Valle guilty of violating the CFAA, but the Second Circuit 
reversed this decision, calling the conviction “highly problematic” 
because, while Valle was authorized to access the information, he was 
using the information for unauthorized purposes.49  The Second Circuit 
held the court should construe the statute narrowly so as not to 
“unintentionally turn ordinary citizens into criminals.”50  The Second 
Circuit also hinted a broad construction could turn seemingly innocent 
behavior, like checking one’s Facebook at work, into a punishable 
offense.51  While Valle’s case may seem like an extreme use of the CFAA, 
other circuits have also found interpreting the language to be difficult and 
have followed the same narrow approach as the Second Circuit. 
                                                                                                                         
 42 Id. 
 43 See supra Part II.C-D. 
 44 United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 45 Id.; see also “Cannibal Cop” Gilberto Vale found guilty of plot to kidnap, kill and 
eat women, CBS NEWS, (May 12, 2013) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cannibal-cop-
gilberto-valle-found-guilty-of-plot-to-kidnap-kill-and-eat-women/. 
 46 Valle, 807 F.3d at 512. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 523.  In opening statements, Valle’s attorney argued he did not violate the 
CFAA because, while Valle did violate the terms of his employment conducting the search, 
he did not “obtain any information he was not entitled to obtain.”. 
 50 Id. at 527. 
 51 Id. 
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The Fourth Circuit wrestled with interpreting the CFAA in WEC 
Carolina Energy Solutions v. Miller.52  In that case, the defendant, Mike 
Miller, and his assistant downloaded files from WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions (“WEC”) and then used those files at a new company to poach 
a potential client from WEC.53  The Fourth Circuit held that while Miller 
may have misappropriated the information, he did not exceed his 
authorized access.54  The court reached this conclusion by relying on 
WEC’s complaint, which stated Miller had access to intranet, WEC 
servers, and confidential information.55  In conceding these points, WEC 
essentially stated Miller had authorized access to confidential information, 
which led to the dismissal of the claim.56 
The Ninth Circuit used the narrow approach with its opinion in 
United States v. Nosal I.57 In Nosal I, an employee, David Nosal, 
convinced his coworkers to download confidential source lists for an 
executive search firm.58  Nosal then left the company and started a 
competing business.59  All of the employees at the firm were aware of the 
company’s explicit policy forbidding use of the company’s confidential 
information.60  Nosal was charged with aiding and abetting his former 
coworkers to exceed their authorized access.61  The count was dismissed 
by the district court after a motion for reconsideration.62  The court 
reasoned “[t]here is simply no way” the definition of “exceeds authorized 
access” was meant to include company policies. 63 
The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that the government’s argument 
would make the CFAA too broad.64  The court also agreed with Nosal, 
maintaining that the CFAA was only ever intended to be an anti-hacking 
                                                                                                                         
 52 687 F.3d 199, 200 (4th Cir. 2012).  WEC filed suit against Miller, claiming Miller 
had violated the CFAA and exceeded his authorized use of the data from the files. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 207. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id.  The court used a narrow approach, which concluded an employee exceeds 
authorized access by gaining access to information outside of his approved access; see also 
Id. at 204.  This meant that the court did not find an employee exceeded authorized access 
when they improperly used such data. 
 57 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012).  A judge in that opinion wrote: “Computers have 
become an indispensable part of our daily lives.  We use them for work; we use them for 
play.  Sometimes we use them for play at work”; See also generally LVRC Holdings LLC 
v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining how the Ninth Circuit also used a 
narrow interpretation in another employment case). 
 58 Nosal 676 F.3d at 856. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857. 
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statute.65  The court advocated that a broad interpretation would “make 
criminals of large groups of people who would have little reason to suspect 
they are committing a federal crime.”66  The court argued a broad 
construction of the CFAA would make seemingly innocent activities such 
as instant messenger chatting or checking social media punishable simply 
because those activities may be against company-wide computer-use 
policies.67  Further, this could allow companies to improperly fire 
employees because the company could threaten the employee with FBI 
interference for misuse of company computers.68  Thus, a broad 
construction could “invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” 
because the employer-employee relationship would evolve from one 
governed by tort and contract law to one governed by criminal law.69  On 
May 5, 2017, Nosal petitioned the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.70 
D. Left Click: Broad Interpretations 
In contrast, while the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have 
generally held the Act’s language should be read narrowly, the First, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a plain-language reading.71  
Instead, these four circuits use more of a reasonable-expectations test 
when describing acceptable behavior under the CFAA.  This test, best 
described by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Phillips and United States 
v. John, says that when a person exceeds the reasonable expectations of 
the intended-use of the data, the person has violated the CFAA.72 
To better explain this, the first major case that depicted a broader 
interpretation of the CFAA and how it could affect data use comes from 
                                                                                                                         
 65 Id. at 858. 
 66 Id. at 859. 
 67 Id. at 860. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.  In a subsequent proceeding regarding the prosecution of Nosal for conspiring 
with his former coworkers to violate company policy, the Ninth Circuit vacated in part and 
remanded the case to the district court because Nosal had by the “ordinary meaning” of 
“without authorization” violated the CFAA.  Id. at 869.  The Ninth Circuit still maintained 
that Nosal I was correctly decided because authorization was not an issue, as the coworkers 
had authorization from the company despite the fact that they had clearly and admittedly 
violated company policy.  Id. at 874.  The court reasoned that because Nosal instructed his 
coworkers to break that company policy, he satisfied the necessary element of intent and 
thus was a conspirator for violating the “without authorization” portion of the CFAA.  Id. 
at 880. 
 70 Aurora Barnes, Petitions of the day, SCOTUS BLOG (Jul. 11, 2017, 10:31 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/petitions-of-the-day-40/. 
 71 See infra Part IV. 
 72 See infra footnotes 82–97 and accompanying text (explaining the intended-use 
analysis and how these circuits derive their interpretations). 
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the First Circuit in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.73  Explorica, 
a company founded in 2000, arranged global trips for students.74 The 
company was a direct competitor to EF, which was the largest privately-
owned teen travel company in the world.75  Employees from EF left to join 
Explorica and sought to undercut EF’s prices to take over the student travel 
market.76  Part of Explorica’s strategy was to build a “scraper” that would 
extensively search EF’s website for pricing on tour codes.77  Explorica 
then used the information to undercut EF’s prices.78  After finding out 
about the scraper during a separate lawsuit, EF was granted an injunction 
against Explorica from using the scraper, and filed a lawsuit claiming 
Explorica violated the CFAA.79 
The First Circuit, in rendering its decision, did not decide whether 
the use of a scraper would satisfy the CFAA’s language of “exceeds 
authorized use.”80  Instead, the court found that because there was a broad 
confidentiality agreement between the employee involved in this lawsuit 
and EF, the employee exceeded authorized use when he contributed to the 
development of the scraper and the subsequent use of the scraper on EF’s 
website.81 
This broad interpretation was better defined in United States v. 
Phillips, a case involving Christopher Andrew Phillips, a freshman at the 
University of Texas.82  Phillips signed a computer-use policy upon 
matriculation, but shortly after starting school, Phillips began to steal data, 
including passwords.83  Eventually, Phillips stole “a veritable 
informational goldmine,” including bank account information, birth 
                                                                                                                         
 73 274 F.3d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 579. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id.  Scrapers are used on the Internet for search engines to filter content and find 
information.  Id.  The difference with Explorica’s scraper is that the scraper only targeted 
EF’s website, recording more than 30,000 inquiries and price information and then 
tunneling that information into a comprehensive spreadsheet for Explorica.  Id.  Explorica 
used the scraper twice, amassing 60,000 lines of data, which is equal to around eight 
telephone directories.  Id. at 580. 
 78 Id. at 579 
 79 Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d at 580.  The court found that, because the employee 
instructed a tech company how to decipher EF’s website and find the tour codes, the 
employee had exceeded the authorized use of EF’s website.  Id. at 583.  The employee 
attempted to argue that all of the information was available on EF’s website; however, the 
court found the employee exceeded his authorized used because of the language of a 
contract he signed: “which might reasonably be construed to be contrary to the interests of 
EF.”  Id. 
 80 Id. at 581. 
 81 Id. 
 82 477 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 83 Id. 
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records, and Social Security numbers.84  Despite warnings, Phillips used a 
“‘brute-force attack’ program” to steal up to six Social Security numbers 
per second.”85  A jury convicted Phillips under the CFAA, and he received 
five years’ probation, five-hundred community service hours, and 
restitution in the amount of $170,056, which he subsequently appealed.86 
The Fifth Circuit used an intended-use test to determine if Phillips 
violated the CFAA when he used the university’s computer system to 
gather data.87  In doing so, the court stated that the CFAA should be read 
broadly to determine whether or not the access exceeded authorization.88  
To establish that, a court must first determine if a reasonable person would 
understand that what they were doing was outside of what the website’s 
owner intended.89 
The Fifth Circuit further clarified the aforementioned analysis in 
United States v. John.90  In that case, the defendant, Dimetriace Eva-Lavon 
John, was an account manager at Citigroup.91  Through her position, John 
had access to customer account information.92  John gave her half-brother 
printouts of screenshots of customer information and eventually gathered 
the confidential information of at least seventy-six corporate customers.93  
John’s half-brother used that information to incur fraudulent charges 
against four of those corporate customers.94  John tried to argue that she 
did not violate the CFAA when she accessed the customer’s data because 
she was authorized to use Citigroup’s computers and accessing that data 
was a part of her job.95  The First Circuit again used the intended-use 
analysis to reason that what John did was in fact a violation of the CFAA: 
To give but one example, an employer may “authorize” employees to 
                                                                                                                         
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 218.  The attack cost the university close to $200,000 to assess the damage and 
notify victims.  Id.  It was estimated over the fourteen-month attack that Phillips gained 
access to 45,000 people’s information, but claimed he never intended to use or sell the 
information.  Id. 
 86 Id. at 218–19. 
 87 Id. at 219.  Phillips attempted to argue that because the university’s website was a 
public application, he was an authorized user.  Id. at 220.  In making their decision, the 
court reasoned that, while anyone could type the URL for the university’s website into the 
search bar, the university had to grant access for individual users and that created a 
contractual relationship that Phillips violated.  Id. 
 88 Phillips, 477 F.3d at 219. 
 89 Id. at 219-220. 
 90 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 91 Id. at 269. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 271.  In a parsing of the statute, John argued the CFAA does not cover the 
actual use of the information but instead only covers accessing, obtaining, or altering data 
she was not authorized to obtain.  Id. 
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utilize computers for any lawful purpose but not for unlawful purposes and 
only in furtherance of the employer’s business.  An employee would 
“exceed [ ] authorized access” if he or she used that access to obtain or 
steal information as part of a criminal scheme.96  The Fifth Circuit 
reasoned that because she was authorized to access the information for 
limited purposes only and understood that as a part of her job description, 
John thus exceeded authorized access when she used the information 
outside of the scope of her employment.97 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit furthered the implications of the 
intended-use analysis by finding that merely accessing the information 
would violate the CFAA.98  In United States v. Rodriguez, Roberto 
Rodriguez worked for the Social Security Administration and had access 
to Social Security numbers, addresses, birthdates, and other information 
due to the nature of his job.99  Rodriguez refused to sign acknowledgment 
forms about policies regarding the databases.100  It was through this 
monitoring that the Administration flagged Rodriguez’s access and told 
Rodriguez that the Administration was conducting a criminal 
investigation.101  Rodriguez claimed he was conducting a whistleblowing 
expedition to see if the Administration would notice his unauthorized 
use.102  Rodriguez was sentenced to one year in prison and one year of 
supervised release.103  Rodriguez relied upon United States v. John, saying 
that only the use of the information would be a crime; the court, however, 
corrected Rodriguez, finding that because he conceded he had exceeded 
his authorized use, it did not matter what purpose Rodriguez had for the 
information.104  The court also noted that it did not matter that Rodriguez 
did not use the information to defraud or for financial gain.105  Simply 
exceeding his authorized use was enough to convict Rodriguez 
criminally.106 
                                                                                                                         
 96 John, 597 F.3d at 271. 
 97 Id. at 272. 
 98 See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 99 Id. at 1260.  On numerous occasions, Rodriguez accessed information of former 
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E. Force Quit: The Call for Reform 
In 2010, Aaron Swartz, a co-founder of the popular website Reddit, 
was indicted for “attempting to download all of the electronically archived 
materials maintained by JSTOR while accessing them through a computer 
network operated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(“MIT”).”107  Swartz allegedly downloaded millions of articles from 
JSTOR, a digital library boasting more than 2,300 academic journals and 
historical information, and then released the documents so that anyone 
could read and interpret them.108  On January 11, 2013, Swartz committed 
suicide.109  If Swartz had been convicted, he could have faced up to thirty-
five years in prison.110 
Some called Swartz’s actions political activism and used the 
indictment and subsequent suicide as proof that the reach of the CFAA 
needs curtailing.111  As a result, in June 2013, Representative Zoe Lofgren 
of California introduced H.R. 2454, commonly known as “Aaron’s 
Law.”112  The law would amend the CFAA to strike the phrase “exceeds 
authorized access” and instead replace it with the phrase “access without 
authorization.”113 
The amended CFAA would define “access without authorization” as: 
“(A) to obtain information on a protected computer; (B) that the accesser 
lacks authorization to obtain; and (C) by knowingly circumventing one or 
more technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude or 
prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining that information.”114  
These amendments would imply that violations of terms of service or 
acceptable use policies would not qualify as exceeding authorized 
                                                                                                                         
 107 United States v. Swartz, 945 F.Supp.2d 216, 217 (D. Mass. 2013); See also 
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http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/09/the_computer_fraud_and
_abuse_act_turns_30_years_old.html. 
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access.115  The law did not pass in 2013 and failed to become codified law 
when  reintroduced in 2015.116 
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, who has also proposed an amendment 
to the CFAA, criticized Aaron’s Law, claiming it would decriminalize 
insider hacking.117  Major technology and software companies, such as 
Oracle, Adobe, and the Software and Information Industry Association, 
oppose changing the CFAA with such mechanisms as Aaron’s Law.118  
Oracle alone spent $1.5 million for each quarter in 2013 for lobbying 
efforts to stop Congress from passing Aaron’s Law because the broad 
language makes litigation more favorable to companies.119 
F. Restart: Texas’ Version of the CFAA 
On December 31, 1984, Texas State Senator Ray Farabee introduced 
Senate Bill No. 72, a bill “relating to the creation of offenses involving 
breach of computer security.”120  The bill later passed on May 25, 1985, 
following administrative and substantive changes.121  Senator Farabee 
recognized the importance of computers, citing the difference between 
personal computer sales in 1976 and 1982: none and $1 billion, 
respectively.122  At the time the bill was introduced, thirty-five states had 
computer crime bills on the books. 123 
                                                                                                                         
 115 See Wolff, supra note 107.  Terms of service is described by PC Magazine as rules 
a person or organization must follow in order to use a service.  See also Terms of Service, 
PC MAG, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/62682/terms-of-service.  They are 
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prohibited behaviors, like spamming.  Acceptable use policy, PC MAG, 
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 121 See generally S.B. NO. 72, supra note 120. 
 122 Id. at 5. 
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The current language of Texas Penal Code § 33.02 “Breach of 
Computer Security” reads as follows: “(a) A person commits an offense if 
the person knowingly accesses a computer, computer network, or 
computer system without the effective consent of the owner.124  Part (b-1) 
makes the scope of the offense very clear: 
A person commits an offense if, with the intent to defraud or harm 
another or alter, damage, or delete property, the person knowingly 
accesses: (1) a computer, computer network, or computer system without 
the effective consent of the owner; or (2) a computer, computer network, 
or computer system: (A) that is owned by: (i) the government; or (ii) a 
business or other commercial entity engaged in a business activity; (B) in 
violation of: (i) a clear and conspicuous prohibition by the owner of the 
computer, computer network, or computer system; or (ii) a contractual 
agreement to which the person has expressly agreed; and (C) with the 
intent to obtain or use a file, data, or proprietary information stored in the 
computer, network, or system to defraud or harm another or alter, damage, 
or delete property.125 
There are only two defenses within the Texas Penal Code § 33.02: 
legitimate law enforcement purposes and when someone contracts to 
provide computer security.126  Texas has also codified the same law as a 
civil claim in Section 143.001 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies 
Code.127 
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III. FROM DIALUP TO WIFI: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE CFAA IN 
THE MODERN AGE 
With a variety of interpretations from seven circuits, it is difficult to 
see how a company or a prosecutor should handle an allegation of a 
violation of the CFAA.128  Mere miles across a state line can mean the 
difference between jail time and walking free due to broad 
interpretations.129   This growing strife between interpretations and the dire 
consequences created a variety of opinions and options of where the 
CFAA may go next. 
A. Password Required: A Look at the Different Opinions on the CFAA 
In an interview with Slate.com, Former New Jersey Representative 
William J. Hughes stated that Congress was trying to create a law that 
would help solve future problems when it developed the CFAA.130  He 
stated that, “We were attempting to anticipate the problems that surely 
would evolve over time . . . .”131  Representative Hughes analogized that 
since there were laws on the books that protect breaking into a home, 
Congress should also try to prevent theft of information stored on 
computers.132  As the use of the CFAA has transitioned over the years, it 
is clear that some courts favor a broad interpretation of the law while 
others favor a narrower one.133  Opponents of the CFAA point to the 
inconsistencies with interpretations and the range in punishments as 
support for reform.134  Specifically, opponents are looking for “narrower 
definitions, gentler punishments, and clearer exceptions carved out for 
security researchers.”135   Meanwhile, Representative Hughes is calling for 
the exact opposite: “I suspect that we may have to go back and broaden 
the statute even more to make sure that we’re catching everything and 
everyone we should be.”136  He cites the CFAA as essential for protecting 
property in the age of cyber attacks.137 
                                                                                                                         
data or perform specific functions.”  Id.; § 33.01 (6) (West 1985).  Finally, a computer 
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A group of academic researchers and journalists attempted to reform 
the second category of cases in the summer of 2016.138  With the help of 
the American Civil Liberties Union, the researchers filed a complaint for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against Attorney General Loretta Lynch, 
alleging that the CFAA makes violating a terms of service agreement a 
crime.139  The plaintiffs in the case claim that they pose online as people 
of different races to research potential discrimination in hiring and housing 
practices.140  By claiming to be people they are not, the plaintiffs are 
violating the terms of service and could be prosecuted under the CFAA.141  
The complaint points out that even the Justice Department’s manual on the 
CFAA states that “exceeds authorized access” is: [R]elatively easy to 
prove that a defendant had only limited authority to access a computer in 
cases where the defendant’s access was limited by restrictions that were 
memorialized in writing, such as terms of service [or] a website 
notice . . . .142 
Reform efforts are also underway in the third category of cases with 
the sentencing of Matthew Keys.  Keys was a former Reuters employee 
who gave members of the hacker group “Anonymous” login information 
for the Tribune Media.143  Upon obtaining this information, Anonymous 
altered a headline on a story on the LA Times website, which was live on 
the Tribune Media website for about forty minutes.144  Those forty minutes 
turned into a two-year sentence for Keys, who was convicted of violating 
the CFAA for giving his information to Anonymous.145  Again, Keys did 
not post the headline himself, but merely shared his login information.146  
The eight-word headline allegedly cost Tribune Media $929,977 in 
defacement.147  When convicted, Keys tweeted out, “That was 
bullsh**.”148 
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B. Do You Wish to Debug? Ideas on What Happens Next 
The American Bar Association suggested that repealing the CFAA 
would not be a total blow to either the criminal or civil realms.149  For 
example, if the CFAA were repealed, Prosecutors could continue to look 
to the federal trade-secrets statute in 18 U.S.C. § 1832.150  That trade-secret 
statute was critical in cases like WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. 
Miller.151  Trade secret charges may be the best alternative route for 
prosecutors to charge defendants with, as it is more narrowly tailored to 
target people who “knowingly [and] without authorization cop[y], 
duplicate . . . download, upload, destroy, . . . transmit, deliver, . . . or 
convey such information . . . ” for an economic benefit.152  If someone 
violates the statute, they can be convicted for up to ten years in prison.153  
A violation of the federal trade secret law covers at least in part what 
legislators set out to do with the CFAA. 
In terms of civil alternatives, employers have other avenues available 
through a variety of claims.154  Employers could easily bring claims of 
“breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, tortious 
interference with an economic advantage, unfair competition, or 
misappropriation of trade secrets.”155 
In 2011, Professor Michael Risch from Villanova University’s 
Charles Widger School of Law posted in a blog about the “scary” 
implications of the CFAA and interpretations.156  In dissecting the 2011 
ruling in United States v. Nosal, Risch suggested that the CFAA could be 
fixed by requiring a two-part standard for the CFAA.157  First, an action 
under the CFAA must be tied to an independent wrongful action; for 
example, trade secret misappropriation.158  Second, that wrongful action 
would need to be tied to exceeding authorized access.159 
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Another suggestion would be to reject both of the circuits analyses 
and instead akin authorization to a physical trespass with similar 
elements.160  This would require a prosecutor or a plaintiff to prove three 
elements to be successful: (1) access violating an express or implied 
prohibition; (2) the alleged violator knew or should have known about the 
prohibition; (3) and, the prohibition would be “material or related to the 
underlying policy of trespass.”161  The second element breaks down into 
three subcategories to prove knowledge of the prohibition: a code-based 
approach, a notification approach, and a social norm approach.162  A code-
based approach, like a password, would be required if the computer’s 
owner had some sort of program to stop access and the user knew they 
were exceeding their authorization.163  Another approach could be a 
notification that certain access is unauthorized, like a disclaimer or a terms 
of service post.164  The last type of knowledge to show a user knew or 
should have known they violated their terms of access would be a social 
norm approach.165  An example would be a hacker continuously accessing 
a website with a program that shuts down the website’s server.166  While 
the hacker was authorized to visit the site, social norms would suggest the 
hacker was not authorized to visit the site in such an aggressive manner to 
shut the site down.167 
There are inherent problems with this physical trespass approach.  
While a code-based approach to understanding whether or not the user 
should have known their access exceeded authorization would seem to be 
a simple solution, consider the following scenario from Michael L. Levy, 
the Chief of Computer Crimes for the United States Attorney’s office in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.168  One employee asks another to 
login to his computer at work while he is away so she can relay some 
information.169  From a code-based approach, the second employee would 
not know or have reason to know that they had exceeded authorized 
access.170  If that same employee then guessed the first employee’s 
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password and used it, they would still not have violated a code-based 
approach.171  This is because they were able to overcome the code of the 
program and still access the information.172  Thus, there was nothing 
impeding the second employee’s access.173 
Also, the notification approach poses an issue to the physical trespass 
approach.  Lawyers spend hundreds of hours drafting terms of service 
agreements that are rarely read or contemplated until someone has a 
problem with the website.174  Therefore, the notification is not actually 
effective because the user does not have actual notice, just constructive 
notice.  For example, if a person tweaks his or her dating profile to make 
his or herself seem more interesting by saying he or she has traveled to 
Paris but does not qualify that statement as Paris, Texas, that person has 
violated a notification approach.175  Another example of a violation of a 
notification approach would be providing the wrong phone number or 
email address to avoid unwanted marketing.176  These seemingly harmless 
activities would violate a notification approach even though they are not 
malicious or criminal in society’s view.177 
Lastly, the social-norm approach toward determining knowledge 
proves difficult in the changing way people use technology.178  In Judge 
Reinhart’s Nosal II dissent, he pointed out that today password sharing is 
the norm.179  In fact, Judge Reinhart said the CFAA “does not make the 
millions of people who engage in this ubiquitous, useful, and generally 
harmless conduct into unwitting federal criminals.”180  Instead, he 
concluded that the CFAA was not meant to cover the everyday sharing of 
passwords such as with Netflix.181  Because so many people engage in 
password sharing, it is hard for people to conceptualize that they are 
violating a social norm in the process.  Although parents of adolescents 
everywhere may hate it, the excuse “everyone’s doing it” makes sense for 
a social-norm approach.  While perhaps one of the other two notification 
approaches would cover this type of behavior, the social-norm approach 
is problematic when certain behaviors become commonplace. 
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Another approach to fixing the problems with the CFAA includes 
amending the language, like that of Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and 
Senator Lindsey Graham’s July 2015 proposal.182  The amendment would 
replace the language of the CFAA to “intentionally access[ing] a protected 
computer without authorization and thereby obtain[ing] information from 
or caus[ing] damage to any such protected computer.”183  However, the 
proposed amendment uses “protected computer,” and calls for the same 
definition currently in the CFAA.184  That definition is narrow and would 
only protect government computers or those used for interstate or foreign 
commerce.185  For example, unless an employer is the United States 
government, a financial institution, or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce, the amendment does not cover a situation in which someone 
stole information from their employer.186  While the phrase interstate 
commerce could be stretched to almost any situation, without a more clear 
definition of the type of information this amendment would protect, this 
amendment leaves the CFAA weaker, rather than stronger than before. 
IV. CLICK HERE TO AGREE: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CFAA CRISIS 
In order to fix the CFAA to provide a more uniform approach, the 
Supreme Court could grant certiorari and give courts a uniform 
interpretation, or Congress could pass an amendment to the CFAA, 
providing better definitions and context on how the CFAA should be used. 
A. System Override: The Supreme Court Option 
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Nosal v. United 
States to answer the question concerning whether the CFAA should be 
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interpreted in a broad or a narrow manner.187  Unfortunately, on October 
7, 2017, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.188  Nosal was ideal because 
it fit into the third category in which the CFAA normally arises; when an 
employee takes data from their employer and then uses that data for their 
own gain.189  The first category, when someone is hacking or stealing 
information, would cause less of a controversy under the current language 
of the CFAA because that type of behavior would fall into the 
unauthorized access portion of the CFAA.190  Alternatively, the second 
category, essentially exceeding the terms of service or an acceptable use 
policy, would benefit from a more definitive answer, but since those types 
of cases rarely arise, an interpretation for the third category would cover 
this second category.191 
United States v. Nosal, was a perfect example of the type of case the 
Supreme Court should grant certiorari for, as it involves an employee who 
took his work-granted privileges and used them in a manner not intended 
by their employer.192  Nosal took confidential information from his 
employer so he could start his own firm in the same business.193  A 
Supreme Court decision would have been helpful because deciding an 
interpretation for the CFAA should be all-encompassing.  Then, the 
Supreme Court should interpret the CFAA in a broad sense like the First, 
Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.194 
The CFAA was passed as a way to combat a new type of crime in an 
age when the impact of computers and the data they could create and store 
was not fully comprehensible.195  Even so, the principle behind the CFAA 
remains the same: to protect information stored electronically.196  Under a 
broad interpretation, the CFAA can do just that.  By looking at the 
individual circumstance, a court should answer just one question: would a 
reasonable person understand that what the accused was doing was outside 
of the intended-use of the access granted?197  This would allow the 
government and companies to protect their information, which is at the 
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heart of the CFAA.  By following this analysis, a court would almost 
always come down in favor of the government or a company.  While this 
may seem harsh, the purpose of the CFAA is clear.198  Congress intended 
to protect data and, in a digital age, there can be no loopholes. 
B. Rewiring the CFAA: A Suggested New Approach 
If the Supreme Court does not eventually grant certiorari and 
Congress instead decides to amend the CFAA, there are three major 
considerations.  First, Congress should emphasize data rather than 
computers in any amendment.  Second, Congress should seek to fully 
define all aspects of an amendment, creating one interpretation of the law 
for courts to follow.  Finally, Congress should consider bifurcating the 
civil and criminal aspects of any amendment. 
First, Congress should amend the CFAA in title and scope to focus 
on what they are actually trying to protect: data.  The CFAA is not truly 
concerned with the desktop or laptop computer on every employee’s 
desk.199  Nor is the CFAA aimed at the cellphone in the pocket of almost 
every American with a smartphone.200  The CFAA is aimed at protecting 
data.201  This slight tweak covers the information stored electronically and 
is a better descriptor at the root of the litigation.  If an employee were to 
walk out of the office with the intent to steal their work computer, it would 
be theft.  If the employee were to take the information from the computer, 
they are only stealing the data.  This data is the root of the three categories 
of cases involving the CFAA.  Hackers do not hack computers to steal 
equipment; they do so to steal data.  One potential definition of data comes 
from Texas’ version of the CFAA.202  While not the most updated version, 
this definition does encompass the purpose of the law rather than 
computer. 
“Data” means a representation of information, knowledge, facts, 
concepts, or instructions that is being prepared or has been prepared in a 
formalized manner and is intended to be stored or processed, is being 
stored or processed, or has been stored or processed in a computer. Data 
may be embodied in any form, including but not limited to computer 
                                                                                                                         
 198 See supra Section II.A. 
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 200 Mobile Fact Sheet, Pew Research Center, PEW INTERNET (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/.  The Pew Research Center found seventy-
seven percent of Americans own a smartphone.  Id.  In 2011, that number was just thirty-
five percent in 2011.  Id. 
 201 See supra Section II.A. 
 202 Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 33.02 (West 1985). 
42 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 14:19 
printouts, magnetic storage media, laser storage media, and punchcards, 
or may be stored internally in the memory of the computer.203 
Second, Congress should amend the CFAA with a new definition of 
“exceeds authorized access.”  Alternatively, Congress should adopt a 
version of the CFAA similar to Texas’s law since Texas’ law fully 
encompasses all three categories of CFAA cases.204  If Congress were to 
re-define “exceeds authorized access,” using the broad interpretation of 
“whether a reasonable person would understand what the accused was 
doing was outside of the intended-use of the access granted,” courts could 
apply a more uniform approach to CFAA cases across all three categories.  
This would still come with the problems under the second category 
mentioned above.205  Alternatively, by adopting a statute similar to Texas’, 
all three categories would be managed in a more uniform manner.  Texas’ 
law is focused on both hackers and employees, both private and 
government, who use information in an unintended way.206  Specifically, 
section (b-1) covers the first and third category of cases completely, 
making it a crime to both hack and take information from an employer.207  
By further describing what the person intended to do in (b-1)(C), 
employees who accidentally access information would not be subject to 
prosecution.208 This interpretation would also limit the second category of 
cases because of the narrow intent definition.  With this definition, 
researchers, like those of the ACLU tracking possible discriminatory 
practices, would not be subject to prosecution.209  Instead, Texas’ language 
sets out narrow parameters that would encompass the purpose the CFAA 
is trying to protect in a way that would favor a more uniform interpretation. 
Finally, the CFAA currently has the same standard for both a 
criminal and civil application.  In Texas, the civil component of the CFAA 
law lowers the mens rea standard to knowingly or intentionally.  This 
allows those who want to sue under Texas’s version of the CFAA an 
opportunity to recover if the conduct does not rise to the same level as the 
intent under (b-1)(2)(C).  Congress should consider bifurcation of the 
criminal and civil standard in any future amendments to offer protection 
of the same conduct that does not rise to the level of criminal culpability.  
This would further Congress’ justification for the statute while still 
                                                                                                                         
 203 Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 33.01(11) (West 1985). 
 204 See supra Section II.B. 
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delineating the difference between conduct that should be penalized with 
prison time or not. 
C. Error Message: Authority not Found 
Even without a definitive answer as to which analysis courts should 
use or what amendments should be adopted, there are steps employers can 
take to protect themselves against litigation.210  First, employers can draft 
comprehensive polices that explicitly delineate the appropriate access 
standards for employees to avoid litigation.211  Next, employers could 
invest in computer systems that allow access to be broken down to 
different levels.212  This would allow employers to keep employees from 
gaining access to data that they do not need to complete their tasks.213  
Employers also need plans in place for when employees leave.214  This 
would include terminating remote access and making sure employees 
return all work-issued devices with access to any employer-related 
network.215  Finally, employers should reiterate that employees are not to 
continue to access the work networks after their work is complete and they 
leave the company.216 
V. UNPLUGGING 
The issues with the CFAA will not disappear or become any less 
relevant.  Instead, the differences between the interpretations will only 
continue to increase as technology continues to advance.  While the 
parsing of words and individual circumstances make the CFAA tedious, 
the CFAA was intended to protect Americans in a way that no other law 
can do.  The CFAA will only continue to become more important.  
Congress needs to amend the law as quickly as possible so the unbalanced 
prosecution of citizens can be leveled.  If Congress does not act, eventually 
the Supreme Court needs to grant certiorari to determine an interpretation.  
The law needs to be used as it was intended instead of resulting in an 
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unequal playing field that defendants are currently a victim of — some 
courts punishing the same acts other deem acceptable. 
